Normative models of choice usually predict preferences between alternatives by computing their value according to some criterion, then identifying the alternative with greatest value. An important consequence of this procedure is captured in the economic concept of rationality, defined through a number of principles that are necessary for the existence of an ordinal scale of value upon which organisms base their choices. Violations of these principles, such as some recently reported breaches of transitivity and regularity in birds and honeybees, have strong implications for the understanding of decision mechanisms in humans and nonhumans alike. We investigated rationality in risky choice using European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris. Birds had to choose between two or three food sources, each associated with a different variance in delay to reward. In three experiments, starlings were strongly risk prone, showing regular and consistent preferences in binary and trinary choices. Preferences also satisfied weak and strong stochastic transitivity. Our results extend the generality of previous research in risk-sensitive foraging to situations where more than two alternatives are present and suggest that violations of rationality in risk-sensitive choices may be expressed only under restricted sets of conditions. 
Normative models of choice usually predict preferences between alternatives by computing their value according to some criterion, then identifying the alternative with greatest value. An important consequence of this procedure is captured in the economic concept of rationality, defined through a number of principles that are necessary for the existence of an ordinal scale of value upon which organisms base their choices. Violations of these principles, such as some recently reported breaches of transitivity and regularity in birds and honeybees, have strong implications for the understanding of decision mechanisms in humans and nonhumans alike. We investigated rationality in risky choice using European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris. Birds had to choose between two or three food sources, each associated with a different variance in delay to reward. In three experiments, starlings were strongly risk prone, showing regular and consistent preferences in binary and trinary choices. Preferences also satisfied weak and strong stochastic transitivity. Our results extend the generality of previous research in risk-sensitive foraging to situations where more than two alternatives are present and suggest that violations of rationality in risk-sensitive choices may be expressed only under restricted sets of conditions. Theories of decision making developed by evolutionary biologists and economists share many features and have interesting differences. One shared feature is the expectation of behavioural coherence, namely that a subject's preference system should behave 'rationally'. Here we use the term rational in the economist's sense, meaning only that preferences are consistent across contexts, regardless of what these preferences are or the process by which the subject makes decisions. Mas-Collel et al. (1995, page 6) encapsulated the idea thus: 'The hypothesis of rationality is embodied in two basic assumptions about the preference relation: completeness and transitivity'. Completeness implies that there are well-defined preferences between all possible pairs of options, and transitivity that if 'a' is preferred to 'b' and 'b' to 'c' then 'a' should be preferred to 'c'. For cases when subjects are faced with repeated choices and preference is not absolute but partial, transitivity is usually redefined in probabilistic terms as stochastic transitivity. Regularity is another property frequently invoked as a test of rationality (Luce 1977; Simonson & Tversky 1992; Tversky & Simonson 1993) . We treat regularity in more detail later, but its basic postulate is that the addition of alternatives to the choice set can never increase the choice probability of a given option.
Breaches of rationality present an interesting challenge, because there are few normative frameworks in biology that are compatible with such violations (see Houston 1997 for an important exception), and hence it makes sense to investigate how prevalent these violations are. Recent reports of violations of rationality by rufous hummingbirds, Selasphorus rufus, honeybees, Apis mellifera, and grey jays, Perisoreus canadensis (Shafir 1994; Hurly & Oseen 1999; Waite 2001a, b; Bateson et al. 2002; Shafir et al., 2002) open the possibility that irrational choice may be common. If this were the case the predictive value of normative (optimality) modelling should be questioned. To follow this issue we investigated transitivity, regularity and context dependence in risky choice using European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, choosing between distinct levels of variance in delay to food rewards.
First we consider why rationality is commonly expected by normative theorists. If the decision maker assigns a score to each alternative according to an ordinal scale of 'taste', 'worth', 'satisfaction', 'utility' or, in the case of biology, expected fitness gain, then decisions based on maximizing these criteria should not breach rationality. The normative modeller ranks the options according to a conceptually orderly scale based on the fitness consequences of each choice. Violations of rationality question the existence of an ordinal scale of preference, and this goes against the spirit of the game.
